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Abstract 
The paper examines the interdependence of historical legacies and current contextual factors 
as  determinants  of  economic  and  political  performance.  It  shows  that  behavioral  patterns 
based on identical legacies could lead to very different (if not the opposite) results in regions 
with different contextual socioeconomic characteristics. Specifically, the paper compares the 
demand for litigation as an important aspect of judicial performance in two different historical 
and cultural regions of Romania, which have been in the past under indirect Ottoman rule and 
part of the Habsburg Empire respectively. Although Romania is currently a centralized state 
with common judicial system, both parts of the country inherited substantially different lega-
cies from the history. We find that while in rich regions Habsburg legacy leads to higher de-
mand for litigation than the Ottoman, in poor regions the situation is reversed. The results 
remain robust for various specifications, controls and estimation techniques. 
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Habsburg legacy, Ottoman legacy 
JEL classification: K41; K42; N44; O17; P26 
ISSN: 14369753 
 
Acknowledgements: the authors appreciate the very helpful comments of James Robinson, 










Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 








Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 




2. Expressive and instrumental demand for litigation ...............................................................7 
3. The changing judicial system in Romania...........................................................................11 
3.1  Ottoman and Habsburg legacies...............................................................................11 
3.2  Towards a centralized state and judicial system.......................................................16 
3.3  Formal uniformization and informal socialization...................................................18 





9. Appendix: Data....................................................................................................................48 
 
 
 History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 175 
 
1.  Introduction 
The impact of historical legacies on political development and economic performance 
has been acknowledged in social sciences and in economics (e.g. North 1990). In many cases 
institutions have a long-term and lasting effect: examples include the influence of European 
colonization (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Olsson 2009) and pre-colonial states (Gennaioli and Rai-
ner 2007) in developing world, political history of the European states (Tabellini 2010), legal 
traditions of the US states before entering into the Union (Berkowitz and Clay 2005), legacies 
of  Communist  rule  (Alesina  and  Fuchs-Schundeln  2007)  and  Holocaust  (Acemoglu  et  al. 
2010). An interesting question, which arises in this respect, is whether there is any reinforcing 
or modifying impact of the current contextual factors on these historical legacies. Does a par-
ticular legacy always help (or harm) current development? Or it may be helpful in one cir-
cumstance and harmful in another one?  
In fact, the very literature on the impact of informal institutions and legacies originates 
from huge variation of the performance of similar formal institutions in different environ-
ments. Political institutions, which seemed to function properly in the US, did not deliver the 
same outcome in Liberia (where the ruling elite was constituted by Afro-American emigrants) 
or in Latin America; the same is true for the otherwise identical political institutions in the 
Northern and in the Southern Italy. Similar institutional changes (like the “colored revolu-
tions” in the former Soviet Union) deliver very different outcomes in Ukraine, in Georgia and 
in Kyrgyzstan. Historical legacies provide a tentative explanation for this variation – the same 
formal institutions encounter different informal behavioral patterns, causing contradictions 
and  conflicts  (Herrmann-Pillath  1993;  Helmke/Levitsky  2004;  Leipold  2006;  Levit-
sky/Murillo 2009), and had different histories of performance in the past shaping the “collec-
tive memories” of the society (Rothstein 2000). Even in this case the question remains which 
mechanism is particularly determining the effect of legacies. Yet in the next step one ought to 
ask, whether the impact of identical legacies as such can also be different, depending on the 
general environment. 
Anecdotal studies of individual countries and impact of historical and cultural specif-
ics on their development are often able to link similar institutions to entirely different out-History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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comes. “Confucian values” and “Asian specifics” were used to explain the weakness of the 
East Asian economies in the nineteenth century; the rise of Japan in the twentieth century; but 
also the “Asian crisis” and the deficit of structural reforms in Asia and Korea in the 1990s 
(and currently are used again to explain the “miracle of China”). Both current stable democ-
racy and the Hitler totalitarian regime can be “explained” by the German historical tradition 
(Lukin/Lukin 2009). Partly the reasons for this variation come from the difficulty to identify 
the effects of the historical paths and the legacies, which are, in some sense, always unique for 
each country (and therefore one is likely to find an explanation for almost every outcome) and 
often considered in a too simplistic way (Herrmann-Pillath 2010); however, it may also be the 
case that the same legacies, which provide impetus for economic growth in one environment, 
turn  into  a  problem  in  another  one.  The  legacy  remained  the  same,  but  the  conditions 
changed, and so did the influence of the legacy on economic and political performance. Dif-
ferent sets of informal institutions and practices may be “complementary” to different eco-
nomic and political conditions, thus causing different results.  
Central and Eastern Europe has for the last two decades served as a playground for the 
analysis of historical legacies in numerous papers (e.g. Kopstein/Reilly 2000; Stark/Bruszt 
1998). The region received particular attention because of the presence of multiple partially 
conflicting factors associated with pre-Communist and Communist periods of its past, which 
made  the  identification  of  the  “relevant  histories”  particularly  important  (Cirtau-
tas/Schimmelfenning 2010). The literature looked at both communist legacies (e.g. Jowitt 
1992) and pre-communist historical development (Brown 1996; Panther 1997; Kitschelt 2003; 
Winiecki 2004; Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007; Jahn/Müller-Rommel 2010). Several studies explic-
itly consider the “overlap” of legacies and their variation across various areas of analysis (i.e. 
economic, cultural, institutional, political) and with time (Ekiert/Hanson 2003; Pop-Eleches 
2007), as well as influence of more proximate factors (e.g. Mendelski 2009; Cameron 2007; 
Jahn/Müller-Rommel 2010; Vachudova 2005; Linden 2002; Orenstein et al. 2008). Most of 
the literature includes inter-country studies, which focus on economic variation (e.g. Fish 
1998;  De  Melo  et  al.  2001;  Katchanovski  2000),  democracy  variation  (e.g  Ekiert/Hanson 
2003; Agh 1998) or politico-administrative variation (e.g. Grzymala-Busse 2002). Some in-
tra-country  studies  examine  inter-regional  variation  in  those  states  which  were  under  the 
domination of different empires before World War I (e.g. Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian Em-History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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pires or Prussia), such as Ukraine (Katchanovski 2000; Darden forthcoming), Poland (Zarycki 
2007) and Romania (Sum/Badescu 2005; Roper/Fesnic 2003).  
This paper aims to explicitly look at the interaction of historical legacies and contex-
tual factors (e.g. education, economic development), using a unique dataset on the variation of 
judicial performance across counties of Romania. To our knowledge, the interaction of his-
torical legacies and the current contextual factors has never been explicitly examined in this 
literature before – a research gap we intend to fill in this paper. Our approach takes advantage 
of the intra-country variation of historical legacies. Examining differences between (histori-
cal) regions in one country has the clear benefit in terms of controlling for the unobserved 
heterogeneity (see Snyder 2001). Romania as a currently centralized unitary state is an inter-
esting case from this point of view. Different parts of Romania have belonged to either Habs-
burg (Austria-Hungary) or Ottoman domains for a significant period of time; currently, how-
ever, Romania is a centralized unitary state. Thus, this paper makes a contribution to the 
analysis of historical legacies examining intra-country variation and placing the legacies in 
the current context. In this sense, it is complementary to several other recent econometric 
studies (Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007; Grosjean 2011; Becker et al. 2011) examining the impact of 
the Habsburg and Ottoman legacies on other institutional characteristics, as well as economic 
development in Central and Eastern Europe both within and across country borders. 
Our main focus is on judicial performance – an area, which, on the one hand, is likely 
to exhibit strong impact of legacies (as it is associated with the issues like quality of bureauc-
racy and trust into the government and law), and, on the other hand, has rarely been investi-
gated in the research on Central and Eastern Europe (as opposed to, say, economic growth or 
democratization).  Specifically,  we  study  the  demand  for  litigation  (at  the  level  of  appeal 
courts - tribunals) in various regions of Romania. Furthermore, we also look at various chan-
nels of transmission of legacies, particularly through the persistence of ethnic minorities from 
the  imperial  past;  therefore,  this  paper  also  contributes  to  some  recent  research  (Dar-
den/Grzymala-Busse 2006; Wittenberg 2006; Peisakhin 2010; Darden forthcoming), which 
concentrates its attention on pinpointing the underlying causal mechanisms which link the 
past and the present in case of the legacies.  History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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Our results are unequivocal. We show that different historical legacies account for dif-
ferences in the demand for litigation/jurisprudence and reflect differences in court backlogs in 
tribunals. However, unlike the previous literature, we demonstrate that these differences in 
litigation behavior can be explained by the interaction of informal institutions (which sur-
vived as legacies from the past) and contextual factors (education, economic development). 
We do not find an unambiguous “Ottoman burden” and “Habsburg advantage” from the de-
velopment viewpoint: while in rich regions Habsburg legacy generates higher demand for 
litigation than the Ottoman, in poor legacies the situation is reversed. Thus, the basic message 
of the paper is that the effect of institutional legacies is dependent on present contextual fac-
tors. Furthermore, we cannot confirm the hypothesis that the legacies are associated with the 
presence of ethnic minorities, remaining from the Habsburg or Ottoman past. There seem to 
be more subtle mechanisms of legacy transmission in place. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on our main theoretical predic-
tions.  Section 3 introduces the background of the two historically diverse regions in Roma-
nia. Section 4 introduces the main conceptual framework and the key hypotheses which we 
test econometrically. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the results and tries to 
provide causal mechanisms. The last section concludes.  
2.  Expressive and instrumental demand for litigation 
The  discussion  of  determinants  of  demand  for  litigation  has  an  old  and  well-
established tradition in Law and Economics. The most obvious interpretation of a legal claim 
from this point of view is that of an investment opportunity pursued by the litigant based on 
the expected benefits and costs (Landes 1971; Posner 1973; Cornell 1990). The costs are de-
termined by case-specific circumstances, but also by institutional arrangements, as it has been 
shown in numerous comparative studies of demand for litigation across different countries 
(Shavell 1982; Hughes/Snyder 1995; Chappe 2011). One of the prominent lines of argumen-
tation suggests that litigation should increase as a result of economic growth (Jacobi 2009), 
because of larger resources at hand of the parties (which can be used for the litigation pur-
poses) and of higher complexity of issues they encounter making informal mechanisms of 
dispute resolution insufficient. This approach to the demand for litigation does not exclude the History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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probability of biases, caused, for example, by the information imperfections and incorrect 
assessments of the outcome of the trial (see Langlais 2011 and the literature cited in this pa-
per).  
An alternative approach links the demand for litigation to the cultural specifics of par-
ticular countries – and thus ultimately to historical legacies. One of the countries, which re-
ceived particular attention from this point of view, is Japan: the low demand for litigation in 
Japan observed after World War II has been explained by the dominance of “harmonious val-
ues” in the society and preference for informal dispute resolution. This issue has been investi-
gated in various empirical papers, often heavily criticizing the culturalist argument from both 
theoretical and empirical points of view (see the overview in Ginsburg/Hoetker 2006 and 
Feldman 2007). Yet the historical and cultural legacies do not necessarily reflect themselves 
in a straightforward way. It is possible to hypothesize two further channels of their effect on 
the demand for litigation.  
First, history affects the priors for the assessment of probabilities of success, which are 
likely to depend on the overall level of confidence into the government. The last factor is 
claimed to be among the key issues influencing the ability of emerging economies to trans-
plant and to establish legal institutions (see e.g. Oleinik 2005). If the government is perceived 
as not trustworthy, there will be low trust into the ability of courts to resolve disputes in a fair 
and impartial way. Therefore, litigation should be perceived as a rather useless endeavor. 
From this point of view, societies with lower level of confidence into the government should 
exhibit lower demand for litigation. 
Second, it is reasonable to assume that the demand for litigation can be not only in-
strumental (as in the case described above), but also expressive. The expressive behavior im-
plies that the action is chosen not in order to  achieve  a specific  goal  but rather for self-
expression purposes (the idea has been discussed in sociology by Lin (2002) and in econom-
ics by Hillman (2010)
1). The most obvious example of expressive behavior, which received 
                                                 
1 Hillman (2010) also points out that in many cases an actor is not merely indifferent about achieving the stated 
goals of the expressive behavior but in fact prefers that the latter are not achieved (expressive behavior trap). 
This problem is typical for collective action situations; litigation is a case of individual choice, thus, in our 
case, expressive behavior merely implies that the decision is made regardless of the probability to achieve the History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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substantial  attention  in  political  economics  starting  from  Buchanan  (1954)  and  Tullock 
(1971), is voting: in this case the low costs of the voting act combined with extremely high 
costs of being sufficiently informed make expressive behavior a plausible explanation for the 
voting decisions. In this case the voters make their decision expecting that it will have no ‘in-
strumental’ benefit for them, merely to state their position (e.g. dissatisfaction with the politi-
cal process). Another example of expressive behavior could be a support of a public campaign 
which the participant ultimately believes to be useless, but which demonstrates the signatory’s 
position, or charitable contributions, which the contributors themselves consider to be unable 
to really improve the situation of those who the charity is directed to (even more, parents can 
derive expressive utility from overfeeding their children). Litigation, unlike voting, is a costly 
process, and therefore the role of expressive behavior is likely to be smaller; yet one cannot 
outright reject the opportunity that individuals go to court for expressive purposes. In this 
case, litigation can be driven by the social environment of the claimant or even by emotions.
2  
All three channels of the impact of history on the demand for litigation suggest a de-
viation from the ‘optimal’ litigation in individual societies. It is reasonable to hypothesize that 
in the societies only recently exposed to modern market economies and with long history of 
non-democratic  regimes  with  strong  redistributive  appetites  the  deviation  is  likely  to  be 
stronger. First, these societies should have developed more advanced informal tools of con-
flict resolution. Second, many of them have lower trust to the state.
3 Hence, one can expect 
severely biased expectations of the litigants. Third, one could expect the litigants in these 
countries to be more prone to expressive behavior, as a result of lower trust to and familiarity 
with the legal system and legal procedure. The direction of the deviation is therefore not en-
tirely clear: while the low trust creates a downward bias in the litigation, expressive behavior 
                                                                                                                                                         
stated goals – one goes to court even if one does not expect to achieve anything or if one knows that the 
court’s decision will not be implemented. 
2 For example, Russian citizens are known to be among the most active litigants at the European Court of Human 
Rights. Clearly, it does not always represent the expressive behavior, since the litigation procedure is difficult 
and costly and the Russian judicial system demonstrates very poor performance – hence, the appeal to the 
European institutions becomes necessary. However, it is also the case that the implementation of the decisions 
of the European Court in Russia is in many cases questionable and excessively delayed, so, the benefit from 
being successful is not straightforward – hence, some component of the expressive behavior could also be pre-
sent in this case.  
3 Though it is not necessarily the case and depends upon the peculiarities of their historical path. History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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is likely to shift the demand for litigation upward. Thus, even if legacies matter, one is not 
entirely sure in which way. 
However, a more interesting link emerges if one looks not at direct impact of historical 
legacies, but rather at the interaction between legacies and the current economic performance. 
As we have mentioned, the ‘investment’ view of litigation suggests that the increase of eco-
nomic well being should ceteris paribus increase demand for litigation. However, introducing 
the historical influences is likely to challenge this relation. For instance, if the actor has low 
trust into the government and legal system, she will still use extra-legal dispute resolution 
mechanisms even if her economic well-being increases: she will rather perceive the increase 
of resources as a factor improving her standing in this system of negotiations. This debate of 
whether economic prosperity causes more demand for good institutions, particularly given 
low level of trust into the government, remains unresolved as of now (see Libman 2010 for a 
literature survey). Similarly, expressive behavior does not depend on the actual winning prob-
ability and importance of the decisions disputed and, therefore, reduces the dependence of 
demand for litigation on economic well-being.
4 
To conclude, it is plausible to conjecture that while the direction of bias in the demand 
for litigation between societies with different historical legacies is not clear, in societies less 
exposed to the market and with strong experience of less efficient bureaucracies in the past, 
the demand for litigation should be independent of economic well-being. If the historical lega-
cies merely reduce the trust into the government, for both high and low income these societies 
should exhibit lower demand for litigation than other societies, but the distance between the 
demand for litigation among poor societies with different legacies should be smaller than 
among the rich ones. If the expressive behavior also plays a certain role, an even more inter-
esting outcome can appear: in poor societies those with historical legacies favoring expressive 
behavior are likely to exhibit higher demand for litigation; in rich societies, on the contrary, 
the benefits of instrumental litigation could become high enough so that the instrumental de-
mand exceeds expressive demand, and the societies with historical legacies favoring expres-
sive behavior should experience relatively lower demand for litigation than other societies.  History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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  There are several caveats to be made in this case. It is possible that the expressive be-
havior changes if income increases (for example, because people are more likely to behave 
expressively, if they expect relatively low personal costs from these actions, and the relative 
personal costs of litigation decrease if the income increases). However, if one expects expres-
sive behavior to be strongly influenced by cultural norms and standards, which are subject to 
the legacy transmission through informal socialization mechanisms, one could expect it to be 
relatively robust over time. Furthermore, legacies could directly influence income and the 
design of legal institutions. A partial way to account for these differences is to concentrate on 
intra-national comparison, if there is sufficient within-country variation in historical legacies, 
but formal legal institutions are identical (and there is also large inter-regional redistribution 
from the center). The case of Romania, as it will be shown in the next section, provides an 
attractive empirical playground for this research. Finally, the impact of legacies does also 
change over time: it is possible to hypothesize that the increasing wealth could contribute to 
the decline of the impact of legacies. It would imply that the impact of legacies can be estab-
lished only for certain income levels, but not for all of them. We will explicitly address this 
issue in our empirical strategy.   
 
3.  The changing judicial system in Romania 
3.1 Ottoman and Habsburg legacies 
The present-day Romanian territory has been an area of competition of great powers 
throughout its history. From the fourteenth century on, various parts of it have been under 
control of the Ottoman Empire, either directly, or through a system of suzerainty relations 
with local rulers. In late 17th century the north-western part of the country, Transylvania, be-
came part of the Habsburg monarchy; the eastern and southern parts of the country, Walachia 
and Moldavia, remained Ottoman vassal states. In the mid-19th century Ottoman dominance 
was crippled; in 1859 Walachia and Moldavia were united (forming the basis for the modern 
                                                                                                                                                         
4 Low trust and propensity to expressive behavior can interact: if the trust in legal institutions is low, one is likely 
to assume that the litigation cannot be used for achieving “instrumental” goals at all, and then the judiciary is, 
if at all, used only due to expressive behavior concerns. History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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Romania), and in 1877 they declared independence from the Ottoman Empire. It was as late 
as after World War I that the Transylvania was re-integrated in the Romanian state, alongside 
with Bukovina, another part of the Habsburg Empire, annexed as part of the divisions of Po-
land in the 18s century. 
Thus, both Habsburg and Ottoman rule over various parts of Romania stretched for at 
least several centuries, resulting in significant cultural, institutional and politico-economic 
differences. Looking at the descriptive statistics of the first half of the 20s century (see Table 
1) clearly reveals the dichotomy between two parts of Romania. The territories of the former 
Habsburg Empire were economically and structurally better developed, more diverse in terms 
of ethnicity and religion, and had a more literate population than the Ottoman regions. In con-
trast, people in Ottoman regions (Moldavia, Wallachia, Dobrogea) were on average poorer, 
ethically less diverse, mostly Orthodox and less literate.  
 
Table 1: Regional historical differences in Romania under the Ottoman and Habsburg 
Empires  





Economic  and  structural    de-
velopment 
a.  railway  lines  by  1900  (km 
per 100 th. pop) 
b. number of commercial banks 
in 1910-1911 
c.  output  per  capita  in  firms 
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(for  the  years  1900;  1910; 
1930; 1948) 
Minorities  Muslims, Russians, Ukrainians  Hungarians, Germans, Jews 
Religion (1934)  Mainly Orthodox, few Muslims  Greek-Orthodox 
(34.8%),Greek-Catholic  (25%), 
Catholic  (17.1%),  Calvinists 
(12.6%),  Lutherans  (4.9%), 
Jewish (3.5%) 
Legal and judicial system  Customary  law,  French  civil 
law, inefficient judiciary 
Customary  law,  Austrian 
ABGB,  Hungarian  law,  effi-
cient judiciary 
Informal institutions  Clientelist  vertical  networks, 
corruption,  few  trust  in  state 
institutions 
Horizontal  networks,  few  cor-
ruption, more trust in state insti-
tutions 




Strong Magyarization  
 
Sources: Illyes 1981; Sugar 1977; Maxim 2001; Macartney 1956; Lampe/Jackson 1982. 
 
What is more important for us is that Habsburg and Ottoman regions are claimed to 
have significant differences in terms of their informal institutions, though due do different 
factors. In some sense, it is possible to speak about weak Ottomanization and strong Hungari-
zation (Magyarization). In contrast to Habsburg territories, the Ottoman principalities Walla-
chia and Moldavia had certain state autonomy and were institutionally less penetrated by the 
Ottoman Empire. As vassal states, they had to pay high tribute (taxes) to the sultan but were 
able to keep their own nobility and princes (instead of Ottoman-Muslim governors) and their 
former financial, politico-administrative and judicial structures (e.g. customary law as op-
posed to the Ottoman religious law and local self-administration) (Maxim 2001: 20f; Sugar 
1977: 281). “Ottomanization” of Wallachia and Moldavia was therefore done more indirectly 
with the help of Phanariots, Ottomans of Greek origins who ruled between 1711/1716 and History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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1822. Their period was characterized by impoverishment of the population, increasing turmoil 
and extreme corruption (Sugar 1977: 122f; Jelavich 1983: 103).
  
One can argue that blaming only the Ottoman Empire for introducing corruption and 
underdevelopment to Romania would be inadequate, as the principalities were already less 
developed than Transylvania before the Ottomans conquered the country (Maxim 2001: 208). 
However, it is still likely that due to the long interaction with Ottomans and Phanariots, Ro-
manians from the principalities renewed or reinforced certain undesirable habits and attitudes 
to organize social, political and economic relations in a more informal way, e.g. through the 
use of bakshish (bribe) and nepotism. Overall, it is usually claimed that informal institutions 
in the Ottoman region were associated with clientelist vertical networks, absence of trust and 
more corruption (Sugar 1977; Brown 1996). Negative cultural traits, which were ascribed to 
Ottomans in the Romanian case, were “cleverness, expressed in attempt to get around obsta-
cles, including those erected by authority, by using none-too-ethical (from the point of view 
of the government) or even illegal means. The notion persists that it is perfectly permissible to 
cheat and steal from the government…” (Maxim 2001: 212).
  
From the 18th century onwards Walachia’s and Moldavia’s legal system started to be 
influenced by Western legislation. Legal borrowings and transplants from abroad adapted the 
legislation to Western standards. The Moldovian Code Calimach (1817) was modeled in parts 
after the Habsburg ABGB Civil Code from 1811 and contained also elements from the French 
Civil Code (Bocsan 2006). However, the implementation of these reforms was substantially 
delayed as opposed to the Habsburg Empire. 
In contrast, Habsburg territories were fully incorporated into the Habsburg Empire and 
also more influenced by its assimilation, centralization and Magyarization practices (Seton-
Watson 1925: 104). From this point of view, it is not necessarily the negative Ottoman influ-
ence in the East and the South, and rather the positive effect of the Habsburg/Hungarian rule, 
which one has to concentrate upon. Among other things, being part of the Austria-Hungary 
implied that this region was subject to the Habsburg law and was ruled by relatively efficient 
and well-trained Habsburg bureaucracy (including judges). It was subject to the moderniza-
tion reforms implemented by the Danubian monarchy throughout the 18th and the 19th centu-History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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ries and to Magyarization/Hungarization activities of non-Magyar population towards the end 
of the 19th century. Hungariziation meant first of all learning of the Hungarian language. The 
knowledge of Hungarian (or German), allowed mostly Magyars, (but also Germans) to oc-
cupy important administrative and judicial positions while the Romanian population remained 
peasants or had only subordinate positions. By 1870 the Transylvanian judiciary became en-
tirely Magyarized (Seton-Watson 1925: 104). Compulsory instruction in Hungarian was in-
troduced under the Apponyi Act of 1907 and most public state schools and all high schools 
became Magyar by 1914 (see Macartney 1956: 264).  Such measures spread the knowledge of 
Hungarian which allowed understanding Hungarian legislation. 
In Transylvania, Hungarian legislation (Corpus juris Hungarici) replaced the Austrian 
legislation (e.g. ABGB) in 1867, after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. In contrast to the 
superficially transplanted Western legislation in the Ottoman regions, the Hungarian constitu-
tional law was the result of a historical process and the outcome of a long political struggle. 
The Hungarian Constitution was based on many sources (e.g. own customary law, Austrian 
and German legislation), it followed fundamental rights (Grundgesetze) instead of precise 
formal legal norms (Rechtsnormen) and was relatively well elaborated. It contained detailed 
regulations  on  judicial  independence  (non-removability  of  judges,  immunity,  non-
transferability) and on different judicial conflicts of interest such as nepotism and corruption 
(incompatibility). Judicial accountability over judges and their performance (e.g. punctuality, 
respect of law) was assured by the Ministry of Justice and disciplinary councils (von Ferdi-
nandy 1909). 
The respect of the detailed and coherent legal framework and a good educational sys-
tem contributed to overall fair and impartial judicial decisions which then resulted in rela-
tively high trust in the judiciary among citizens. A well-functioning judiciary had also a dis-
tinct impact on the informal norms of behavior than in the Ottoman regions. Informal institu-
tions in Habsburg regions were associated with the behavioral patterns of Hungarian and 
German minorities which many Romanians adapted: higher social capital (presence of hori-
zontal networks), more trust in state institutions (judiciaries), less clientelism and fewer cor-
ruption and in general more respect for the rule of law (Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007). History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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3.2 Towards a centralized state and judicial system 
The period which followed the collapse of the two Empires, however, was character-
ized  by  considerable  Romanization  and  centralization  activities,  which  affected  especially 
former Habsburg regions. The creation of Romania mare (Great Romania, as it was referred 
in the contemporary literature) was followed by legal unification and the uniformaization of 
civil and penal codes as well as the creation of centralized law for the centralization of judi-
cial organization (1924) (see Goga 2006). However, it was not until the 1940s that Romania 
saw a complete unification of legislation. While it took several years to unify the different 
formal institutions and to create a unitary system (e.g. administrative, legal, educational sys-
tem), gaps in structural and informal institutions persisted for many years (e.g. mentality, re-
ligion, differences in literacy rates and economic development). Imported modernization was 
restricted to formal changes and not structural ones, resulting in a change in forms but not in 
content (see Schifirnet 2007).  
However,  Romanization  of  Bukovina  and  Transylvania  meant  a  break  at  the  elite 
level.  In  Bukovina,  for  instance  (which  had  with  59%  the  biggest  percentage  of  non-
Romanians until 1918), many Jews, Germans and Ukrainians lost their positions in the public 
in the public administration, the judiciary and the educational system or were deported to 
other Romanian regions (1920s) (Hausleitner 2001: 19). Similarly, in Transylvania, Romani-
ans from the Ottoman regions replaced the administrative and judicial positions of Hungarians 
and Germans. However, while most politicians in elected councils became Romanians (even 
in Targu-Mures a town with 75% of Hungarians), there was more continuity in the public 
administration and among the judiciary where minorities succeeded to keep their posts until 
1932, when more systematic purges began and when it became much more difficult for mi-
norities to enter the public services (Macartney 1965: 293-296). The educational system was 
Romanized as well. Most previously Magyar state schools were taken over by the Romanian 
state. However, the confessional school system was not abolished and many primary and 
middle schools were left in the hands of minorities.
5 Higher education became completely 
Romanized (Macartney 1965: 308). 
                                                 
5 In 1934, in Transylvania, Magyars had 993 primary schools and Germans 399. History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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This kind of break at the formal and personal level (depletion of pre-communist lega-
cies) was further accentuated through the  general emigration of Hungarians and Germans 
from  Transylvania.  To  give  an  example,  the  numbers  of  Magyars  and  Germans  declined 
steadily. In 1910, out of a total population of 5.265.444, there were 1.704.851 Magyars and 
559.824  Germans  in  Transylvania  (including  Maramures).  In  1930,  out  of  5.543.250  the 
number of Magyars declined to 1.353.675 and that of Germans to 543.622 (Macartney 1965: 
253). The 2002 census indicates the presence of a Hungarian minority of 1.4 million people 
(about 7% of the population); the German minority with 60,000 people makes out less than 
0.5%. 
After World War II, Romania fell within the Soviet zone of influence; the Communist 
rule was associated with further centralization. At the level of personnel and elites, the first 
step of Romanian Communists was to remove state personnel identified with the previous 
regime. This resulted in an enormous turnover in public employees in the initial years after 
the Communist came to power. Referring to the changes in the legal and judicial system Ve-
niamin (1956: 301) argues that “It is probably in the realm of justice that the Soviet-inspired 
innovations introduced by the R.P.R. communist regime have had the most striking conse-
quences”. Indeed, the break with the pre-communist legal and judicial system was profound. 
Not only did the communists change the formal legal structures and its underlying concept of 
justice, but they  also replaced former magistrates with their own loyal personnel. Former 
judges which were trained according to Western standards have been “systematically elimi-
nated” (Veniamin 1956: 303). However, in Transylvania, there was also some room for conti-
nuity or revival of pre-communist legacies, at least in the initial years after communist take-
over of power. While the prewar bourgeois leadership used Romanian staff, the Romanian 
communist Party “made extensive use of national minorities, especially the Magyar popula-
tion (Graham 1982: 42). So despite centralization measures during the communist takeover of 
power, there were still possibilities for survival of informal institutional legacies. However, 
this initial practice disappeared later on and all of these Hungarian Communists were loyal to 
the central power in Bucharest and its new communist ideology. 
The concept of the unitary state remained the fundamental principle under the new 
Communist regime (Graham 198: 83). It was accompanied by a centralist and hierarchical History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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organization of the state (including the bureaucracy and the judiciary). Former principles of 
judges (impartiality and rule of law) were replaced by the new principles (obedience and dis-
cipline). In his role as a propaganda agent, the judge had to promote conformity among the 
citizens and the judge himself was made conform and obedient in newly created “higher ju-
ridical schools” and “short-order one-year law schools” which replaced the previous legal 
education at universities (Veniamin 1956: 303). These newly created law schools were cre-
ated in the biggest Romanian towns, such as Bucharest, Iasi and Cluj. Initially, legal educa-
tion was decentralized, which allowed for the possibility to train and (re-) educate Ethnic 
Hungarians even in their own language (Ciurea 1956: 241). 
The break with the pre-communist system concerned also other areas relevant for the 
functioning of the judiciary. In the area of education, the control over private schools (de-
nominational and foreign schools) was transferred completely to the state (Ciurea 1956: 178). 
The educational personnel were purged. The hitherto existing curricula were replaced and 
teaching of religion in schools was abolished. New educational institutions, such as unified 
gymnasiums (junior high schools), schools for party cadres and schools for illiterates as well 
as cultural institutes (centers o communist propaganda) were created (Ciurea 1956: 206). In 
short, there was reeducation through uniformization and homogenization. 
3.3 Formal uniformization and informal socialization 
Overall,  one  can  conclude  that  there  was  a  strong  discontinuity  of  pre-communist 
legacies in Romania in terms of structural, formal institutional and elite features. It seems that 
only informal institutions persisted to a certain degree. Table 2 gives a historical overview of 
“Ottomanization”,  Hungarization,  Romaniazation  and  “Sovietization”  activities.  There  are 
good reasons to believe that on the level of formal rules and regional elites (as well as eco-
nomic specifics
6), little (if anything) survived almost a century of centralization. From this 
point of view one can speak about formal uniformization as one of the paths of the develop-
ment of the Romanian institutional structure, caused by both centralization effort of the Ro-
                                                 
6 For instance, the income per capita is currently actually significantly lower in Habsburg than in Ottoman re-
gions. This effect is only due to the presence of the capital (Bucharest) among the Ottoman jurisdictions; if 
one excludes it, no significant difference of the Habsburg or Ottoman legacy regions in terms of income per 
capita can be established.  History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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manian government, but also the external influences (e.g. EU conditionality) causing identical 
judicial and political reforms being implemented throughout the country (Schimmelfennig/ 
Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005).  
 
Table 2: Overview of Ottomanization, Hungarization and Romanization activities 
  Ottoman regions  Habsburg regions 
“Ottomanzation”  Wallachia  (1476-1829),  Mol-
davia (1504-1829), 
Dobrogea (1419-1878) 
Transylvania  (1541-1690), 
Bukovina (until 1774) 
Hungarization  -  1690-1918 (Transylvania) 
1775-1918 (Bukovina) 
Romanization/Centralization  Since 1829/1859 (since 1878 in 
Dobrogea) 
Since 1918 
Sovietization/Centralization  1945-1989  1945-1989 
Sources: Maxim 2001; Brown 1996. 
 
Particularly, Romanian judiciary remains highly centralized. The current structure of 
the Romanian judicial system was established by the Romanian Constitution and the Law 
no.304/2004 regarding the judicial organization. The structure of the Romanian court system 
operates on four tiers. There are 188 local trial courts (judecatorii), 42 county courts (tribu-
nals) which serve as the courts of appeal of the lower level, 15 courts of appeal of the higher 
level and the High Court of Cassation and Justice. The hierarchical and centralized system is 
unitary in the sense that judges are subject to the same legislation, same rules of appointment 
and promotion, same salary levels, independent of the region. With the creation of the Na-
tional Institute in Bucharest, judicial training has been centralized and magistrates receive the 
same quality of education. Legal education at universities follows the same curricula so that 
besides the quality of the professors we can expect no regional differences.  History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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However, the situation is likely to be different with the informal institutions, norms 
and practices. These institutions are claimed to be much more robust and persistent than for-
mal rules (Williamson 2000; Roland 2004). The stability of informal institutions (e.g. mental-
ity, norms of behavior) is transmitted through informal socialization either via education by 
family members (primary socialization), school or religious education (secondary socializa-
tion)  (see  March/Olsen  1989;  Di  Maggio/Powell  1991;  Berger/Luckmann  1966;  Checkel 
1999); even if the school is controlled by the government, norms acquired through primary 
socialization can survive in the family, at least in form of “crypto-morality”, for a long period 
of time (see Greif/Tadelis 2010). Thus, Table 3 summarizes the hypothetical persistence of 
various aspects of Ottoman and Habsburg legacies in Romania and guides our empirical strat-
egy in what follows. 
 
 
Table 3: Change and continuity in Romania’s history   












Ottoman  period 
until  1829/    Habs-
burg period until 
1918 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Inter-war  period 
1918-1939 
Yes/No  No  Yes  Yes/No 
Communist  take-
over 1945-1955 
No  No  No  Yes/No 
Communist period 
1955-1989 
Yes  Yes  No  Yes/No 
Post-communist  Yes/No  No  No  Yes/No History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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4.  Empirical strategy 
As we have described in the previous section, we observe that the legal and judicial 
structures are uniform and we expect that this formal and structural uniformity does not im-
pact on regional variation in judicial performance. If there are differences in judicial perform-
ance (an in particular litigation behavior) the sources of these differences have to be found 
elsewhere – specifically, given the robustness of informal institutions, in the variation of lega-
cies.  
Somewhat simplified, one could perceive judicial performance at the input level as an 
outcome of supply side factors and demand side factors. The supply side of judicial perform-
ance reflects judicial capacity (see Mendelski forthcoming). It is associated with the strength 
of a judiciary to implement legislation in an efficient and low-cost way. This dimension re-
flects structural-economic approaches that stress the beneficial role of economic development, 
state capacity, and human capital in the creation of democracy and rule of law (e.g. Fukuyama 
2004;  Besley/Persson  2009;  Lipset  1959).  It  equally  stands  for  the  international  donors’ 
dominating approach to judicial reform (e.g. World Bank, EU) which emphasizes the impor-
tance of judicial capacity and institution building (Anderson/Gray 2007; Open Society Insti-
tute  2002;  see  Kleinfeld  Belton  2005;  Schimmelfennig/  Sedelmeier  2005;  Hammergren 
2007). The supply side of judicial performance (judicial capacity) is reflected in indicators of 
judicial strengthening such as the relative number of human resources and equipment (e.g. the 
number of judges and prosecutors). The demand side of judicial performance reflects the de-
mand for litigation, i.e. the number of incoming cases to the tribunals, which are affected by History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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certain structural and behavioral features of society or contextual factors, such as education, 
income, ethnicity or crime rates.
7   
An advantage of the Romanian case is that, on the one hand, the supply-side of the ju-
dicial performance (judicial capacity) is likely to be highly homogenous due to the century-
long process of centralization described above, i.e. the formal uniformization. Then the main 
differences in judicial performance stem from the demand side (judicial need). The demand 
side, in turn, is likely to be influenced by the past historical legacies (inherited through in-
formal socialization) and the current development (contextual factors). The resulting differ-
ences in the judicial performance therefore represent the revealed demand for litigation. It 
may be different from the pure “preferences for” and “perception of” the judicial system de-
termined by legacies (which are, for example, at core of the survey-based measures often em-
ployed in the studies of economic and political institutions), as it also takes demand-side con-
straints individuals face into account (e.g. resources they have to pursue litigation); this is, 
however, exactly what we are interested in given our research question. Figure 1 summarizes 
the logic of our investigation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Judicial performance at the level of tribunals 
 
Under these conditions, our empirical strategy is straightforward. We run a series of 
regressions, explaining the judicial performance by a set of contemporary and historical fac-
tors. Our dependent variable in the main regression is the number of unresolved cases per 
                                                 
7 A related literature investigates the demand for law and formal legal institutions (e.g. Pistor 1999, 2002). History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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tribunal as of 2008. The tribunals as the first level of appeal are an appropriate level of the 
analysis: the appeal is, on the one hand, more expensive than the litigation at the trial court, 
and therefore, on the other hand, demand for the litigation at this level should be to a greater 
extent influenced by the conscious decisions of parties and the data ought to be less noisy. It 
does not exclude, however, expressive behavior on this level. Furthermore, the central gov-
ernment puts more effort in ensuring the quality of the judges in these courts, so one can ex-
pect greater homogeneity of supply-side factors, which will make our investigation possible. 
So, we can sort out a lot of noise in the data. We consider the number of unresolved cases as 
an indicator of revealed demand for litigation.  
Our sample includes a cross-section of 41 Romanian counties (we drop one county, Il-
fov, due to the non-availability of information), which is the lowest level for which statistical 
data for Romania is available, and also the level courts of appeal operate with. The data on the 
number of unresolved cases come from the report on the prosecutor’s office activity in the 
year 2008. They capture primarily civil lawsuits, with a certain share of criminal lawsuits 
(11.35 %). Other data are mostly derived from the official Romanian statistics and from the 
Census of 2002.  
Our key explanatory variable is the Habsburg dummy, equal to one for all counties 
originally belonging to the Austria-Hungary (using the borders as they have been determined 
at the onset of World War I
8) and zero otherwise. We attribute 17 countries to the Habsburg 
zone, while the rest has been primarily under Ottoman (and for shorter periods Russian) influ-
ence. In order to account for the main hypothesis of this paper, we interact the Habsburg 
dummy with the various contemporary characteristics, and, more specifically, with two key 
parameters possibly influencing demand for litigation: income per capita and education. Fur-
                                                 
8 Even the intra-country studies of legacies face two difficulties: first, which historical border exactly has to be 
used (border between Habsburg and Ottoman zones shifted over time), and second, how to deal with counties 
divided between Ottoman and Habsburg (since we do not have macroeconomic data for units smaller than 
county, we also cannot use them in our analysis). Until mid-19th century the territories of Danubian Princi-
palities (what we consider the “Ottoman legacy” zone) have partly fallen under Habsburg or Russian occupa-
tion for brief periods of time; however, no permanent long-lasting presence was established and therefore the 
impact of the Habsburg legacies ought to be much weaker than in Transylvania or even Bukovina (which was 
occupied in 1774). As for the borders of counties, we have simply attributed the counties, which have mostly 
belonged to Bukovina or Transylvania in terms of territory to the Habsburg zone.  History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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thermore, we add a set of further control variables to our regressions (for details on the vari-
ables used see Appendix).  
To start with, we look at the level of the overall economic development of the region, 
measured by the income per capita (net nominal monthly earnings); regional population size; 
and the level of unemployment.
9 All data are derived from the Romanian governmental statis-
tics, if not stated otherwise. In a couple of robustness checks we also add some further vari-
ables: the share of urban population, the share of “blue collars” (workers) in the region’s 
workforce, as well as the share of different age groups (possibly representing both standard 
differences over cohorts, but also effects of the transition from Communist rule). As men-
tioned, we interact the economic development (measured by the income) with the Habsburg 
dummy: this interaction is explicitly derived from the discussion above and aims to test for 
the presence of conditional Habsburg effect on the demand for litigation given the level of 
economic development of the counties. Particularly, from the section 2 follows that the Otto-
man regions are more likely to experience both forms of biases (expressive behavior and low 
trust to the government) than the Habsburg regions, given their historical past. Therefore, it is 
likely that the income will cause substantially larger changes in the demand for litigation in 
the Habsburg regions than in the Ottoman region, and we will test this hypothesis in what 
follows. 
However, we also consider a number of further variables in our regressions. Specifi-
cally, we control for the quality of education in the region. For this purpose we use two meas-
ures with different advantages and disadvantages. First, we control for the students in the 
post-secondary education, and second, for the dropout rate in the primary and secondary edu-
cation. The advantage of the first measure is that in Romania primary and secondary school-
ing still cover the main part of the population (if not the whole population). On the other 
hand, it is certainly possible that some regions produce education services for other regions 
(i.e. students leave after completing their studies); yet high number of students still indicates 
higher level of human capital accumulated in the region (given the fact that the very educa-
tional services require professional staff). As for the abandon rate, it is much closer linked to 
                                                 
9 Income per capita ought to be included anyway, since we include the interaction term of this variable with the 
Habsburg dummy.  History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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the regional specifics, but may represent only the “lowest possible” brackets of the education 
distribution. Somewhat simplified, high number of students in the post-secondary education 
may indicate “very high” quality of human capital; high number of dropouts a “very low” 
one. We will also interact the legacy dummy with this variables, since education does affect 
the transmission of legacies over time (although, as mentioned, not determines it) and has a 
substantial influence on the presence of possible biases in the ex-ante probabilities of the suc-
cess in litigation.  
Furthermore, we control for the crime rate in the region, measured by the number of 
cases investigated per capita (note, that we do not take the number of definitive convictions; 
since the latter is rather the outcome of the functioning of the courts than the “input” in the 
efficiency of the judicative function). Although most of the cases we have are civil (88.65%), 
what is also consistent with our data, some fraction of the criminal lawsuits could still impact 
the outcomes of our regressions. Unfortunately, the quality of data we have does not allow for 
simply removing criminal lawsuits from the sample, therefore this procedure becomes neces-
sary. Furthermore, in some regressions we control for the overall number of cases tried at the 
trial courts. Since this variable could be subject to reverse causality, we check for robustness 
of our estimates including and excluding this control.  
Since we are estimating our regressions for a very small sample of 41 counties, where 
the courts of appeal operate, we have to check for the normal distribution of residuals: we do 
it by calculating the Jarque-Bera test and excluding outliers with large residuals until we ob-
tain normal distribution of residuals (for other applications of this approach in region-level 
data regressions see Kirchgässner and Schulz 2005 and Feld et al. 2008). However, already at 
this stage one should remark that this procedure does yield very few changes in our findings, 
demonstrating the robustness of our estimations. 
Finally, the Romanian case makes yet another avenue of investigation possible. We 
have so far claimed that the informal institutions persist primarily through socialization and 
informal contacts. In Transylvania, however, the persistence of informal institutions can be 
related to another feature: large Hungarian minorities, which survived in some of the counties. 
We have stated that it were Hungarian minorities, which during the Habsburg rules served as History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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“transmitters” of informal institutions in Transylvania (along with the Habsburg bureaucracy); 
thus, it is possible that these minorities have also been better at withstanding the pressure of 
the centralized state and keeping the informal norms. We will explicitly check for the pres-
ence of this channel of legacy transmission in our analysis, therefore contributing not only to 
the understanding of the functioning of legacies, but also of a possible mechanism of trans-
mission of legacies. 
Thus, our investigation will be guided by four main hypotheses. 
H1:  Institutional  historical  legacies  (specifically,  pre-Communist  Habsburg  and  Ottoman 
legacies) have different effects on judicial performance at the output level. 
H2: The impact of legacies on demand for jurisprudence is conditional on the current social 
and economic development of the region. 
H3: One should observe a greater change of demand for litigation with the increase of income 
in the Habsburg jurisdictions than in the Ottoman jurisdictions. 
H4: Mechanisms of transmission of legacies can be associated with persistence of ethnic mi-
norities. 
The first hypothesis is, basically, similar to what has been tested by the previous litera-
ture we have discussed before, which also looked at the impact of historical legacies on the 
current institutional characteristics (for financial development or trust and other institutions); 
we, however, add a new area of institutional structure (judicial system), complementing the 
previous studies. Hypotheses H2, H3 and H4 are new, and constitute the main contribution of 
this paper.  
5.  Results 
Table 4 reports our main findings. In regression (1) we estimate the impact of the key 
control variables on the demand for litigation, still excluding the Habsburg dummy. The only 
significant effect is the crime rate: surprisingly, one finds that high crime rate decreases the 
demand for litigation at the level of the courts of appeal. It may indicate that in regions with History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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high crime rates the trial courts are overburdened; thus, the costs of litigation already at this 
stage are very high, making the costs of appeal prohibitive (however, since civil lawsuits 
dominate our sample, this effect should not be over-estimated). Adding the Habsburg dummy 
(regression (2)) does not change our results, but the dummy as such is insignificant. Hence, 
the straightforward approach would indicate that the past has no impact on the current de-
mand for litigation.  
The situation looks very differently in regression (3), where we add an interaction term 
with income. Now both Habsburg dummy and the interaction term are significant at 10% 
level (what is acceptable given or very small sample). In regression (4) we replace the number 
of students by the abandon rates in the secondary education; results remain robust. In regres-
sion (5) we add the total number of cases in the trial courts to our control variables. As al-
ready mentioned, in this case one could expect a high level of endogeneity; nevertheless, our 
findings remain robust. It is interesting to notice that the number of appeals per court is inde-
pendent of the litigation in the trial courts. Regressions (6)-(8) use a number of additional 
controls; the Habsburg dummy remains significant and negative, but the interaction term is 
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Figure 2:  Impact of the Habsburg heritage on the demand for litigation in courts of 
appeal, conditional earnings per capita (10% confidence interval) 
 
However, the simple observation of the sign and significance of the interaction term is 
insufficient to conduct proper analysis (see Brambor et al. 2006). Therefore in Figure 2 we 
plot the marginal effect of the Habsburg dummy for each level of earnings in the counties of 
Romania – because the sample is very small, in order to check for robustness of the findings, 
we do it for all specifications of Table 4. First, the effect differs for different levels of income: 
in extremely poor counties it is negative and significant for all specifications. In extremely 
rich counties the effect is positive, but only partly significant in some of the specifications. 
The set of poor counties in most specifications includes countries with earnings below 850 lei: 
these are, specifically, Bihor, Calarasi, Covasna, Harghita, Maramures, Teleorman and Va-
silu. Three of these counties belong to the Habsburg zone, and four to the Ottoman zone; 
hence, there is no reason to say that our results are driven just by a small set of particular 
counties. On the other hand, for the very rich counties with significant and positive impact of 
the Habsburg heritage our estimations are rather counterfactual, since the results seem to be 
determined by Bucharest. The instability of results for very rich counties may be related to the 
effect of the already mentioned dissipation of legacies, which is likely to be larger for rich 
territories. 
Because  the  number  of  cases  can  be  interpreted  as  a  count  variable,  we  also  re-
estimated specification (3) using negative binomial regression. It is known that for the non-
linear models interpretation of interaction terms is problematic (Ai and Norman 2003), hence 
our findings should be treated with caution: however, the sign and the significance of the History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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Habsburg term and the interaction term between income per capita and the Habsburg dummy 
survive this estimation technique. 
Table 5 explores a further interaction effect: we also interact the Habsburg dummy 
with the education measures (number of students in post-secondary education and abandon 
rates in primary and secondary education). Our main results for the Habsburg dummy and the 
interaction terms with income do not change. The interaction term with education is in both 
cases significant and negative.
10 Unlike the effect of income, which reverses the sign of the 
Habsburg dummy, the effect of education just strengthens the “direct” impact: Habsburg re-
gions are characterized by smaller demand for litigation as opposed to the Ottoman ones ce-
teris paribus especially if the education is either very good (high number of university stu-
dents) or very bad (high dropout rates).  
However, if both education and income influence the extent to which Habsburg legacy 
matters (and how), one should also look at triple interactions between the variables. This is 
done in the last two regressions of Table 4 (for both measures of the educational quality). 
Now the Habsburg dummy and the interaction terms are insignificant, but for a proper analy-
sis one has to look at the specific levels of significance of the Habsburg dummy for different 
levels of income  and of quality  of  education. For the  abandon rates the results are more 
straightforward and reported in Figure 3. For very small dropout rates (e.g. 1%) we indeed 
observe the effects discussed and reported above, with significant and positive Habsburg im-
pact for rich regions and significant and negative for poor regions. If the dropout rates are, 
however, high, the results are not significant at all. Thus, one can conclude that the legacies 
matter only in counties with small dropout rates. One possible interpretation could be that low 
education levels reduce the impact of income on the growth of demand for litigation even if 
the latter is influenced by instrumental and not expressive considerations, since in this case 
the probability of success ought to be estimated as very low. This claim, however, should be 
treated with utmost caution, since the results are not really robust: the results for regressions 
including education measured by the number of students show almost no significant Habsburg 
effects. As mentioned, the very choice of the dropout rates as a proxy for education is ques-
                                                 
10 We have also estimated a specification for the number of university students excluding Bucharest with its 
concentration of university education, but the results did not change.   History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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tionable. Thus, the conservative way of interpreting our findings suggests that we cannot ex-
clude the impact of educational level, the findings with respect to this variable – as opposed to 
income – are not robust.   
Overall, we can make three conclusions. First, Habsburg effects matter, but their im-
pact depends on income and education levels. Second, Habsburg effects increase the demand 
for litigation in rich regions; and decrease in poor regions. Third, both very high and very low 
qualities of education in conjuncture with the Habsburg legacy decrease the demand for edu-
cation. While the effects for income are robust, for education they are more ambiguous and 
(particularly  for  dropout  rates)  could  be  rather  reflecting  noise  than  any  consistent  effect 
(dropout rates are generally very small reaching at most 3.6%, and do not vary a lot over Ro-
mania, so some small fluctuations can produce the results we have obtained). Thus, the robust 
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Figure 3: Impact of the Habsburg heritage on the demand for litigation in courts of 
appeal, conditional earnings per capita and school dropout rates (10% confidence 
interval) 
As a robustness check, we estimate regressions where as the dependent variable we 
use the total number of cases in the trial courts instead of courts of appeal (since we have no 
macroeconomic controls on the level smaller than county – which is where the courts of ap-
peal are created – we sum up the total number of cases in all courts of the respective county). History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
 
 
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 175  31 
 
At this level, however, we find no Habsburg effect, also in interaction with income. Thus, our 
observations are restricted to the appeals.  
So far we were able to establish an effect, but not to show the precise channel, which 
influences the existence of this effect. This is a typical feature of the literature; our subsequent 
analysis, however, aims to discuss this problem in detail. We look at a specific channel of 
influence of legacies in Romania: “Habsburg legacies” here may be also associated with sig-
nificant Hungarian minorities residing in several Romanian counties. We use the data from 
the Romanian Census of 2002, which report the share of ethnic Hungarians (partly forming 
the majority in some of the counties – all of them belong to the Habsburg group). The results 
are reported in Table 6. 
Table 4: Determinants of demand for litigation, 2008; dep.var.: number of unresolved 


















Population  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Earnings  0.113  0.093  0.012  0.003  -0.002  -0.017  0.040  -0.001 
  (0.083)  (0.095)  (0.112)  (0.105)  (0.125)  (0.113)  (0.106)  (0.109) 
Unemployment  -4.912  -6.920  -6.187  -6.238  -6.345  -6.482  -4.932  -5.765 
  (4.846)  (5.421)  (4.940)  (4.553)  (5.000)  (5.076)  (4.803)  (4.145) 
Education 
(post-
secondary)  0.031  0.035  0.033    0.033  0.032  0.031  0.032 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)    (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.019) 
Education 
(abandon rate)        -1.448         
        (11.433)         
Crime rate  -0.048*  -0.047*  -0.046*  -0.035  -0.046*  -0.048*  -0.039  -0.038 
  (0.024)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.028) 
Number  of 
cases  in  trial 
courts          0.000       
          (0.001)       
Urbanization            0.556     
            (0.704)     
Blue collars              -1.782   
              (1.203)   
Age > 65 years                -5.417 
                (4.062) 
Age  40-64 
years                -5.486 
                (4.329) 
Habsburg    -16.977  -206.237*  -229.536**  -213.499*  -209.918*  -185.150*  -259.001** 
    (16.182)  (112.381)  (108.255)  (118.633)  (116.646)  (104.547)  (119.781) History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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Habsburg  * 
earnings      0.204*  0.236**  0.211*  0.201  0.186  0.257** 
      (0.118)  (0.116)  (0.125)  (0.124)  (0.112)  (0.120) 
Constant  77.133  114.839  177.316*  161.123*  196.329  188.527*  247.127*  419.311** 
  (68.251)  (87.399)  (98.924)  (91.042)  (118.089)  (99.112)  (128.724)  (160.474) 
Observations  41  41  41  41  41  41  41  41 
R
2  0.219  0.246  0.286  0.209  0.288  0.297  0.325  0.352 
J.-B. test  8.638**  5.316*  3.765  7.570**  0.127  3.806  3.218  2.289 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% 
level. J-B test refers to Jarque-Bera test for the normal distribution of residuals; H0 is that 
residuals are normally distributed. Outliers are Vrancea in regression (1), (2); Vrancea, Iasi 
and Constanta in regression (3). After exclusion of outliers all effects related to Habsburg 
dummy keep their sign and significance.  
Table 5: Determinants of demand for litigation, education, earnings and Habsburg leg-










Population  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Earnings  -0.046  0.054  -0.069  -0.105 
  (0.125)  (0.118)  (0.164)  (0.385) 
Unemployment  -6.486  -4.028  -7.402  -4.385 
  (4.974)  (4.645)  (5.523)  (4.672) 
Education (post-secondary)  0.051**    0.039   
  (0.021)    (0.060)   
Education (abandon rate)    17.712    -63.043 
    (20.041)    (211.695) 
Crime rate  -0.042  -0.052**  -0.039  -0.050* 
  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.030)  (0.025) 
Number of cases in trial courts         
         
Habsburg  -300.480**  -191.401*  -150.027  -452.280 
  (130.236)  (110.953)  (292.085)  (430.363) 
Habsburg * earnings  0.343**  0.287**  0.190  0.565 
  (0.145)  (0.111)  (0.305)  (0.446) 
Habsburg * Education (post-secondary)  -0.039**       
  (0.018)       
Habsburg * Education (abandon rate)    -39.750*  -0.175  92.837 
    (21.920)  (0.200)  (226.086) 
Education (post-secondary) * Earnings      0.000   
      (0.000)   
Education  (post-secondary)  *  Earnings  *  Habs-
burg      0.000   
      (0.000)   
Education (abandon rate) * Earnings        0.084 
        (0.214) 
Education (abandon rate) * Earnings * Habsburg        -0.142 
        (0.232) 
Constant  223.020*  87.626  245.844  243.882 
  (110.664)  (105.720)  (167.503)  (382.700) 
Observations  41  41  41  41 
R
2  0.340  0.280  0.350  0.289 History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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J.-B. test  3.592  4.653*  3.708  6.713** 
 
Note: see Table 4. Outlier is Vrancea and Iasi in regressions (10) and (12). After exclusion of 
outliers in regression (10) the interaction term between Habsburg dummy and abandon rate is 
insignificant, but still negative. All other effects related to Habsburg dummy keep their sign 
and significance; in regression (12) Habsburg dummy becomes significant and negative; in-
teraction term between Habsburg dummy and earnings significant and positive.  
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Table 6: Determinants of demand for litigation, 2008; dep.var.: number of unresolved 




















Population  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Earnings  0.094  0.100  0.041  0.096  0.088  0.008  -0.054  0.051  0.003 
  (0.094)  (0.098)  (0.102)  (0.091)  (0.098)  (0.114)  (0.129)  (0.122)  (0.118) 
Unemployment  -5.161  -5.457  -4.717  -5.442  -6.740  -6.384  -6.787  -4.182  -6.894 
  (4.802)  (5.427)  (5.233)  (4.898)  (5.521)  (5.041)  (5.085)  (4.909)  (5.249) 
Education 
(post-
secondary)  0.036  0.037  0.053**    0.036  0.031  0.048**    0.035 
  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.023)    (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.022)    (0.023) 
Education 
(abandon rate)        9.275        17.507   
        (12.997)        (20.366)   
Crime rate  -0.048*  -0.048*  -0.043*  -0.047*  -0.047*  -0.045  -0.041  -0.051*  -0.044 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Hungarians  -30.722  81.965  -465.990  -477.930  -11.750  19.854  29.222  9.269  408.395 
  (34.273)  (489.889)  (484.580)  (382.969)  (30.103)  (32.770)  (27.079)  (30.305)  (541.541) 
Hungarians  * 
Earnings    -0.136  0.635  0.930*          -0.525 
    (0.605)  (0.617)  (0.540)          (0.669) 
Hungarians  * 
Education 
(post-
secondary)      -0.137**             
      (0.058)             
Hungarians  * 
Education 
(abandon rate)        -230.254*           
        (114.409)           
Habsburg          -14.650  -237.977*  -351.058**  -204.739   
          (17.054)  (121.865)  (136.617)  (125.900)   
Habsburg  * 
Earnings            0.234*  0.393**  0.295**   
            (0.126)  (0.150)  (0.120)   
Habsburg  * 
Education 
(post-
secondary)              -0.040**     
              (0.019)     
Habsburg  * 
Education 
(abandon rate)                -38.059   
                (22.937)   
Non-Hungarian 
Habsburg 
region                  -378.891** 
                  (174.721) 
Non-Hungarian 
Habsburg 
region  *  Earn-
ings                  0.394** 
                  (0.190) 
Constant  101.156  98.136  136.159  68.837  118.858  179.704*  228.408*  90.338  187.361* 
  (81.797)  (81.537)  (83.533)  (72.421)  (90.625)  (100.669)  (114.506)  (109.616)  (102.263) 
Observations  41  41  41  41  41  41  41  41  41 
R-squared  0.233  0.234  0.291  0.217  0.248  0.289  0.347  0.281  0.314 
J-B test  6.576**  6.547**  7.925**  8.633**  5.147**  3.756  3.427  4.671*  3.871 
Note: see Table 4. Outliers are Vrancea in regression (13), (14), (17), Vrancea and Constanta 
in regression (15), Iasi, Vrancea and Constanta in regression (16), Vrancea and Iasi in regres-
sion (20). After exclusion of outliers interaction term between share of Hungarians and earn-History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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ings in regression (16) becomes insignificant and changes its sign. All other effects remain 
robust. 
Table 7: Determinants of demand for litigation, 2008; dep.var.: number of unresolved 








Population  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Earnings  -0.027  -0.080  0.047 
  (0.115)  (0.125)  (0.131) 
Unemployment  -8.080  -8.346  -5.987 
  (5.791)  (6.029)  (5.826) 
Education (post-secondary)  0.045*  0.058**   
  (0.024)  (0.023)   
Education (abandon rate)      26.964 
      (29.665) 
Crime rate  -0.044*  -0.037  -0.028 
  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.025) 
Hungarians  -4.619  11.54  26.047 
  (34.030)  (29.229)  (46.387) 
Roma  -1,187.421  -980.608  -668.122 
  (695.589)  (635.112)  (506.855) 
Germans  -2,791.906  -3,280.203**  -2,027.846* 
  (1,717.855)  (1,317.306)  (1,134.034) 
Ukrainians  -758.993*  -484.923  -460.586 
  (388.288)  (350.765)  (364.418) 
Russian Lippovan  2,127.825  2,695.922  7,924.978** 
  (3,708.971)  (3,396.496)  (3,758.068) 
Turks  -12,147.492  -14,999.249  -42,016.127* 
  (17,340.981)  (15,860.073)  (20,601.235) 
Serbs  3,087.965*  3,431.232**  3,035.840*** 
  (1,579.051)  (1,523.438)  (977.017) 
Tatars  14,414.721  17,434.143  43,350.492** 
  (17,573.637)  (16,036.978)  (19,932.459) 
Habsburg  -220.233*  -346.955**  -180.846 
  (108.533)  (124.201)  (156.209) 
Habsburg * Earnings  0.247**  0.416***  0.284** 
  (0.111)  (0.135)  (0.122) 
Habsburg * Education (post-secondary)    -0.038**   
    (0.016)   
Habsburg * Education (abandon rate)      -39.096 
      (33.718) 
Constant  254.292*  284.462*  64.973 
  (138.507)  (141.959)  (136.378) 
Observations  41  41  41 
R-squared  0.582  0.628  0.55 
J-B test  5.264*  7.646*  5.049* 
 
Note: see Table 4. Outlier is Vrancea in all regressions; effects of Habsburg dummy remain 
robust. History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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First, we replicate our key findings simply replacing “Habsburg dummy” by “share of 
Hungarians”. The effects for education could have been replicated, but for the income we find 
no effects. Second, we also re-estimate the key results including the Habsburg dummy and 
controlling for Hungarian dummy. Now, “Habsburg” results remain unchanged in almost all 
cases, with some minor exceptions. Finally, in regression (21) we estimate effects separately: 
we form a variable equal to the share of non-Hungarian population in the former Habsburg 
regions and interact this variable and the share of Hungarian population separately with earn-
ings. The effect seems to come only from the regions where Hungarian minority is small; so, 
the presence of the Hungarian minority as such does not cause the effect in question. Table 7 
also controls for other minorities indicated in the Census (which, however, rarely provide 
more than several percent of the population of the county); our results remain robust, at least 
for the interaction with income. To conclude, Habsburg effect does not seem to be driven by 
the ethnic composition of the population. 
 
6.  Discussion 
The econometric results clearly confirm the main conjecture of this paper: demand for 
litigation does depend upon the legacies, but the effects of the legacies depend on different 
levels of income and education. The last effect is not robust and therefore should not be over-
interpreted. The first effect, however, is robust and is very interesting from the point of view 
of the discussion of Section 2. Figure 4 plots the linear trend lines for the relation between 
income and litigation obtained from the Habsburg and Ottoman samples. Both Ottoman and 
Habsburg demand for litigation increases with income; however, the slope of the line for the 
Habsburg regions is much steeper, what causes the effect in question.  History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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Figure 4: Unconditional correlation between the income per capita and the number of 
appeals, linear fit, Habsburg and Ottoman regions 
 
  This result is entirely consistent with the theoretical discussion above. Recall, first, 
that the modern judiciary in Romania is an outcome of the institutional transplantation, which 
was heavily influenced by the European Union in the last years (Mendelski forthcoming). 
Thus, it is rather compatible with informal institutions determined by the Habsburg legacies, 
than with the dominance of extra-legal networks in the Ottoman legacies. Better adaptation to 
modern legal institutions through the course of their history is likely to make Habsburg coun-
ties more prone to instrumental use of the litigation. Since appeal is a costly decision (particu-
larly in emerging economies with low level of income), it is likely that in case of high earn-
ings Habsburg legacy will incentivize higher demand for litigation: high income allows higher 
investments in legal proceedings and therefore increases the chances of favorable outcome. If 
the income is small, on the other hand, Habsburg legacy is likely to support the decision not 
to appeal (because the costs are too high as opposed to possible benefits).  
In Ottoman counties, on the other hand, lower trust to public institutions and expres-
sive behavior are likely to make the demand for litigation more “flat” in income. In fact, our 
results provide some limited evidence in favor of the presence of expressive demand for liti-
gation in Ottoman counties: for very low income levels demand for litigation in this part of History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
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Romania is actually higher than for corresponding Habsburg counties. The situation changes 
for high level of income, when Habsburg counties over-compensate with increasing instru-
mental demand for litigation. For Ottoman counties, furthermore, high income may be associ-
ated merely with the willingness to explore “alternative” ways of solving problems outside of 
legal system (e.g. corruption, nepotism, state capture), what will dampen the increase of the 
demand for litigation once again (though this conclusion may be questionable
11). 
For the simplicity of exposition, the empirical findings can be placed in a 2 x 2 matrix 
according to their regional differences (Ottoman or Habsburg region) and according to their 
contextual variables (income), see Table 7. While rich people who live in former Habsburg 
regions use courts to solve their litigations (instrumental legal litigants), poor people from 
these regions refrain from appealing (instrumental extra-legal peacemakers) because of the 
relatively higher costs of using courts. Instead they tend to resolve their disputes outside of 
courts. In contrast, rich and poor people from former Ottoman regions use courts for expres-
sive purposes (even if their financial situation is relatively bad – but generally speaking re-
gardless of the income): in rich regions Ottoman legacy can also produce greater demand for 
extra-legal litigation (e.g. corruption and clientelism), which could also reduce the impact of 
growth of income on the demand for litigation. 
 
Table 7: Typology of different litigation actors among Romanians 
  Informal institutions in 
Habsburg regions  
 
Informal institutions in Otto-
man regions 
High income  instrumental legal litigants 
expressive legal litigants; possi-
bly use of clientelist networks 
and informal institutions for dis-
pute resolutions 
Low income  instrumental extra-legal peace-
makers: resolution of disputes 
expressive legal litigants 
                                                 
11 It is difficult to assess the spread of informal clientelistic networks depending on income: high income could 
cause greater demand for stability and rule of law, but also can make informal channels more accessible.  History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-
formance in Romania 
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7.  Conclusion 
The impact of pre-communist legacies has been studied by several scholars (see Ek-
iert/Hanson 2003 for an overview). Our within-country study provides a nuanced picture of 
the impact of pre-communist legacies on judicial performance. Specifically, we analyze dif-
ferences in litigation behavior (demand side of judicial performance) in formerly Habsburg 
and Ottoman regions in Romania. The literature usually assumes that there is a direct link 
between the long-term past heritages and the current economic performance or social envi-
ronment; and that that the Habsburg legacies are characterized by higher quality of economic 
institutions and more confidence in the legal system. Thus, it was possible to expect a higher 
level of demand for litigation in the Habsburg region than in the Ottoman region of the coun-
try. 
Our results, however, are more differentiated: we have shown that historical legacies 
matter for the functioning of judicial institutions, but only in combination with current contex-
tual factors (such as income or, to some extent, education). Specifically, we have shown that 
the demand for litigation in Ottoman regions is less sensitive to the increase of income than in 
the Habsburg regions. Thus, while in poor regions Ottoman legacy is associated with higher 
demand for litigation than the Habsburg one, the situation is reversed in rich regions (the re-
sult is partly insignificant, possibly due to the legacies dissipation effect). We conjecture that 
it can be explained by two influences of the Ottoman legacy: lower trust to government and 
higher propensity to expressive demand for litigation (and lower role of the instrumental de-
mand). In fact, our results specifically can be interpreted in line with the last influence, which 
is a plausible explanation for the higher demand for litigation in poor Ottoman than in poor 
Habsburg regions. 
This finding of our study has an important implication for future research. Because the 
interaction of distant (legacies) and  proximate variables is complex, analysis of historical 
legacies ought to be based on more complex conceptual framework and on detailed analysis History Matters, but How? An Example of Ottoman and Habsburg Legacies and Judicial Per-




Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 
Working Paper No. 175 
 
of the interaction of contextual and historical factors in the empirical work. The right question 
to ask is not whether historical legacies matter, but under which conditions (contextual fac-
tors) they matter more or less, and what is their effect in a particular environment.  
There are also two secondary results of this paper to be reported. First, in line with the 
literature on the Habsburg legacies, we have once again confirmed that the Austria-Hungarian 
Empire’s “shadow” in Central and Eastern Europe persists until today, but also in the areas, 
which have not been studied before, like the demand for litigation and judicial performance. 
Second, we have investigated one possible transmission mechanism of historical legacies: the 
role of ethnic minorities. Our results, however, do not confirm that this channel indeed deter-
mines the survival of legacies; we find that the Habsburg legacies are present even in regions 
with smaller Hungarian minorities. It does not mean that the Hungarian minorities do not con-
tribute to the survival of legacies. However, it means that it is not just the presence of minori-
ties, which causes differences between Romanian regions – more detailed and nuanced analy-
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9.  Appendix: Data  
 
Table A1: Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Age > 65 years  42  14.1817  1.8606  11.4000  20.3600 
Age 40-64 years  42  29.9274  1.4933  26.6000  32.6300 
Blue collars  42  57.9886  5.8771  42.7500  66.9000 
Crime rate   42  1313.2860  235.1142  971.0000  1982.0000 
Education (abandon rate)  42  2.0476  0.6830  1.0000  3.6000 
Education (post-secondary)  42  976.0476  804.9567  0.0000  4323.0000 
Germans  42  0.0029  0.0055  0.0000  0.0213 
Habsburg dummy  42  0.4048  0.4968  0.0000  1.0000 
Hungarians  42  0.0859  0.1865  0.0002  0.8471 
Income per capita  42  955.9524  116.9661  792.0000  1398.0000 
Number of appeals  41  84.1951  44.8220  25.0000  206.0000 
Number  of  cases  in  trial 
courts  42  17988.0000  23614.5500  3691.0000  157681.0000 
Population  42  512799.1000  278317.5000  223364.0000  1931838.0000 
Roma  42  0.0268  0.0151  0.0076  0.0702 
Russian Lippovan  42  0.0024  0.0103  0.0000  0.0663 
Serbs  42  0.0011  0.0042  0.0000  0.0198 
Tatars  42  0.0008  0.0050  0.0000  0.0326 
Turks  42  0.0013  0.0056  0.0000  0.0342 
Ukrainians  42  0.0028  0.0105  0.0000  0.0664 
Unemployment  42  4.4643  1.7830  1.4000  9.7000 
Urbanization  42  50.7902  13.6628  31.1700  100.0000 
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Table A2: Description of variables 
Variable  Description  Period  Source 
Age > 65 years  Share of population of 65 years and 
older of age in the population, % 
2007  Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics 
Age 40-64 years  Share of population of 40-64 years of 
age in the population, % 
2007  Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics 
Blue collars  Share of workers in the regional popu-
lation, % 
2007  Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics 
Crime rate   Criminal offenses investigated per 
100,000 people 
2007  Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics 
Education (abandon rate)  Abandon rate in pre-university educa-
tion, % 
2006/2007  Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics 
Education (post-secondary)  Number of students enrolled in post-
high school education programs, peo-
ple 
2007/2008  Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics 
Germans  Share of ethnic Germans in the popu-
lation, from 0 to 1 
2002  Census 
Habsburg dummy  1 if the region belonged to the Habs-
burg Empire, 0 otherwise 
NA  Own compilation 
Hungarians  Share of ethnic Hungarians in the 
population, from 0 to 1 
2002  Census 
Income per capita  Average net monthly earnings  2007  Census 
Number of appeals  Number of appeals in the country 
Tribunals per courts 
2008  Superior Council of Magis-
tracy  
Number of cases in trial courts  Sum of cases investigated in all trial 
courts in the county 
2008  Superior Council of Magis-
tracy  
Population  Total population, people  July 1, 2007  Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics 
Roma  Share of ethnic Roma  in the popula-
tion, from 0 to 1 
2002  Census 
Russian Lippovan  Share of ethnic Russian Lippovan in 
the population, from 0 to 1 
2002  Census 
Serbs  Share of ethnic Serbs in the popula-
tion, from 0 to 1 
2002  Census 
Tatars  Share of ethnic Tatars in the popula-
tion, from 0 to 1 
2002  Census 
Turks  Share of ethnic Turks in the popula-
tion, from 0 to 1 
2002  Census 
Ukrainians  Share of ethnic Ukrainians in the 
population, from 0 to 1 
2002  Census 
Unemployment  Share of registered unemployed, %  December 
31, 2007 
Romanian National Institute 
of Statistics 
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